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FRAUD IS ALREADY ILLEGAL: SECTION 621 OF THE DODD-
FRANK ACT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SECURITIES LAWS
Nathan R. Schuur*
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, lawmakers and the public focused on
abuses in the securitization industry. Abacus, a Synthetic CDO created by
Goldman Sachs & Co., became a symbol of what many felt was a corrupt system
when it became known that Goldman and Fabrice Tourre, a Vice President at its
Correlation Trading Desk, had assisted a hedge fund in designing the security to
fail. Perceived failings of the securities laws to prevent transactions like Abacus
spurred Congress to enact Section 621 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which prohibits con-
flicts of interest in asset-backed securitizations. But the law is unnecessary and
counterproductive. Antifraud laws already address the abuses and certain con-
flicted transactions, if properly disclosed, can be beneficial. The section should be
repealed.
INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the most severe financial crisis since the
Great Depression, lawmakers and the public searched for causes. In
the hearings that followed the crisis, lawmakers honed in on the
sector of the economy in which the crisis originated—the housing
market. In particular, they looked at securitization, or the process
of pooling many home loans into a security and selling that security
to investors, because this practice contributed to the loosening of
loan standards. This loosening eventually resulted in too many bor-
rowers defaulting at one time, which set off the contagion in the
rest of the markets.1 Lawmakers held hearings focusing on behavior
in the securitization market that aggravated the problems securi-
tization caused. One key behavior was the presence of undisclosed
conflicts of interest in the securitization process that allowed unwit-
ting investors to be convinced to buy securities that were “designed
to fail.”2 Though it was not the only firm guilty of this conduct,
Goldman Sachs & Co. (“Goldman”) was frequently singled out at
the hearings as a particularly bad actor in the securitization market.
* J.D. candidate, May 2015, University of Michigan Law School. The author would like
to thank Anne McGinnis for her thoughtful feedback throughout the process.
1. See generally Michael Simkovic, Competition and Crisis in Mortgage Securitization, 88 IND.
L. J. 213 (2013).
2. Staff of S. Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland
Sec. and Government Affairs, 112th Cong., Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a
Financial Collapse, 476 (2011).
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Lawmakers responded to behavior like Goldman’s by amending
the Dodd-Frank Act, which was then winding toward its eventual
passage, to include Section 621,3 prohibiting conflicts of interest in
asset-backed securitizations. This section, however, was both unnec-
essary and counterproductive. The verdicts against individual
wrongdoers and large settlements entered into by their employers
show that existing laws already prohibited Goldman’s conduct. Fur-
ther, Section 621 is so broad that it proscribes conduct that would
be beneficial, and the section may negatively affect the price-discov-
ery process that is essential to well-functioning markets.
Throughout this Note, it is important to remember that securi-
tization is not a problem in itself. Securitization is “a valuable
financial innovation that enables financial institutions to deploy
capital more effectively” than would otherwise be possible.4 Al-
though securitization was the target of a great deal of criticism in
the wake of the financial crisis, it “does not crash economies;
rather, it is unethical and irresponsible people who do.”5 Section
621 targets securitization in general, but the real problem is unethi-
cal participants in the securitization process. This Note argues that
Section 621 is a major shift from existing law, creates more
problems than it solves, and is not necessary because the problem it
purports to address can be solved more efficiently.
Part I of this Note will discuss the securitization process and in-
troduce the specific security, ABACUS-2007-AC1, that Congress
singled out as an example of Goldman’s conflicted practices. Part II
will examine existing law and Section 621. Part III will present rea-
sons the law is unnecessary and harmful, and Part IV will propose a
simpler solution that addresses the bad practices without negatively
affecting the market.
I. BACKGROUND
Before examining the legal framework of Section 621, it is first
necessary to understand the structure of and market for securitized
products. This Part begins with background on the securities cov-
ered by Section 621. It then explains the way the market was
3. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 621, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77z-2a (2012). See Senator Jeff Merkley & Senator Carl Levin, The Dodd-Frank Act Restrictions
on Proprietary Trading and Conflicts of Interest: New Tools to Address Evolving Threats, 48 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 515, 532 (2011).
4. CHARLES AUSTIN STONE & ANNE ZISSU, THE SECURITIZATION MARKETS HANDBOOK xv
(2d ed. 2012).
5. Id.
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supposed to work and ends with a discussion of a synthetic CDO
known as ABACUS-2007-AC1 (“Abacus”), which was cited repeat-
edly by members of Congress as the impetus behind Section 621.
A. Securitization, CDOs, and Synthetic CDOs
A major driver of the loose loan standards in the run up to the
financial crisis was the process of securitization, which allowed
banks to “increase significantly the volume of their consumer and
commercial lending facilities.”6 Before securitization, banks were
only able to lend money that had been deposited by their custom-
ers, but, by securitizing and selling their mortgage portfolios, they
were able to make new loans with the proceeds from their securities
sales. Simple economics dictated that the increased volume availa-
ble to lend naturally lowered the interest rates charged to
consumers, with one study finding that a ten percent increase in
securitization of loans led to a decrease in subprime loans’ interest
rates of between 0.24 and 0.38 percentage points. This allowed
many people who would not otherwise have been able to access
credit to receive loans.7
It is easiest to think of a Synthetic CDO—a CDO related to a
home mortgage, but several layers of abstraction away—as a tower.
Each layer of the tower was formed by securitization, “the process of
pooling relatively illiquid obligations into securities that can be
traded in the capital markets,”8 of the layer below. The tower’s bot-
tom layer consists of home mortgages, which are aggregated
together to form the second layer, a Residential Mortgage-Backed
Security (“RMBS”). Several RMBSs make up the third layer when
they are aggregated by other parties and re-securitized into Collat-
eralized Debt Obligations (“CDOs”). The fourth layer, a Synthetic
CDO, is created by writing what are essentially insurance contracts
for certain parts of the other securities. These insurance contracts
6. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and
the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 984 (2009).
7. Faten Sabry & Chudozie Okongwu, NERA Econ. Consulting & Am. Securitization
Forum, Study of the Impact of Securitization on Consumers, Investors, Financial Institutions
and the Capital Markets 95 (June 17, 2009), http://www.americansecuritization.com/
uploadedfiles/ASF_NERA_Report.pdf [hereinafter Study of the Impact of Securitization].
This intuitive result has been challenged. See, e.g., Andrea Heuson, Wayne Passmore, and
Roger Sparks, Fed. Reserve Bd., Credit Scoring and Mortgage Securitization: Implications for
Mortgage Rates and Credit Availability 40 (Dec. 21, 2000), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
pubs/feds/2000/200044/200044pap.pdf (arguing that “the liquidity premium from securi-
tizing mortgages may have little or no effect on mortgage rates.”).
8. See Sabry & Okongwu, supra note 7, at 16.
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make the Synthetic CDO perform similarly to a CDO containing
the securities referenced by the insurance contracts, allowing so-
phisticated investors to expose themselves to specific yields and risk
levels based on their needs. Each layer of a Synthetic CDO will be
discussed in turn.9
The bottom layer of a Synthetic CDO is a simple home loan,
which, along with other loans, is securitized into the second layer,
an RMBS. An RMBS is formed when the sponsor of the securitiza-
tion,10 transfers a pool of loans to a Special Purpose Entity (“SPE”),
which then issues a set of notes backed by the income stream gener-
ated by the loan pool.11 There is a risk that certain loans in the pool
may go into default, which would cause the SPE to be unable to pay
all its obligations to the noteholders. To account for this risk, the
SPE does not pay all the notes it issued at the same time. The notes
are divided into tranches12 based on their seniority in the payment
order.13 When borrowers make payments on their loans, the SPE
makes payments on the senior tranche of notes first, then makes
payments on the next most senior tranche if money is available, and
continues to pay more junior tranches until either all the money
owed to the noteholders is paid out or the SPE has no more
money.14 The ability to pay more senior holders in full before pay-
ing junior holders allows otherwise risky loans to be pooled to
spread the risk. This means that even when the underlying loans
are risky, “under normal circumstances,” the most senior tranches
will still be “very secure against credit risk” because in order for
them to not be paid, many people must default on their loans at the
same time.15 Junior tranches, in turn, receive higher yields to com-
pensate for the higher likelihood that they will not be paid in full.16
A CDO takes the process one step further, adding a third layer to
the tower. CDOs were created when junior RMBS tranches proved
difficult for issuers to sell because of the higher risk they presented
to investors. Bankers responded by pooling junior RMBS tranches
9. See FRANK J. FABOZZI & VINOD KOTHARI, INTRODUCTION TO SECURITIZATION 211
(2008).
10. Often but not always the issuer of the underlying mortgages.
11. FABOZZI & KOTHARI, supra note 9, at 8–10.
12. Tranche literally means “slice.” A tranche of an issuance is one slice in which all
notes have the same risk.
13. INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: CONTAINING SYSTEMIC
RISKS AND RESTORING FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS 56 (2008), available at http://www.imf.org/Exter
nal/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2008/01/pdf/text.pdf.
14. Id. at 59.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 56.
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into a new security, called a CDO.17 This new security had its own
payment order, meaning, that more senior tranches of the CDO
were thought to be relatively likely to be paid off while more junior
tranches bore the risk of loss and had correspondingly higher
yields.18 As long as losses remained small, only the junior tranches
would take any loss and the senior tranches would continue to be
paid.19
The fourth layer, Synthetic CDOs “developed as an outgrowth of”
regular CDOs and are yet another level of abstraction further away
from actual mortgages.20 Like RMBSs and CDOs, Synthetic CDOs
are sold in tranches that pay based on the performance of other
securities. But, unlike RMBSs and CDOs, Synthetic CDOs are not
composed of actual securities, hence the term “synthetic.”21 Instead,
Synthetic CDOs are a bundled set of contracts—Credit Default
Swaps (“CDSs”)—that function like insurance.22 Each CDS in a Syn-
thetic CDO is a bet on the performance of a specific tranche of  an
RMBS or, sometimes, of a CDO, and, thus, each Synthetic CDO is a
bet on a collection of RMBSs or CDOs.
Unlike regular CDOs, a Synthetic CDO requires two parties to
actively bet against each other. In a regular CDO, all investors are
“long,” meaning they benefit when the homeowners at the bottom
of the structure keep paying, which keeps the value of the security
high. By contrast, a Synthetic CDO requires one party to take the
long position and another to take the short position, meaning they
make money if the homeowners are not able to pay their mortgages
and the value of the security declines.
Synthetic CDOs require both a long and a short party because
they require two separate, offsetting transactions. Rather than buy-
ing bonds, the creator of a Synthetic CDO selects certain securities
that will be “referenced” in the contracts creating the Synthetic
CDO—meaning those securities whose performance will determine
the performance of the entire Synthetic CDO. They then set up an
SPE, which finds long investors who agree to enter into a CDS stat-
ing they will be paid a certain amount every quarter based on the
17. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 127 (2011), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.
18. Id. at 127–28.
19. Id. at 128.
20. MICHAEL S. GIBSON, FED. RESERVE BD., UNDERSTANDING THE RISK OF SYNTHETIC CDOS
1 (2004), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2004/200436/200436pap
.pdf.
21. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 17 at 142.
22. Id.
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performance of the referenced securities. In exchange for this pay-
ment, the long investors agree that if any of the referenced
securities default or experience certain other “credit events,”23 they
will pay the SPE however much those securities are worth.
As the SPE only references securities and does not actually own
them, it needs cash to pay the long investors, which it gets from
short investors. At the same time it sells notes to the long investors,
the SPE enters into a CDS in which it agrees to pay the short party if
a credit event occurs. In exchange for this protection, the short par-
ties agree to pay the SPE every quarter and these payments are
passed on to the long parties.
The payouts of the Synthetic CDO are backed by the payouts on
the CDS written with the long and short parties, not the assets se-
cured by the underlying loans themselves.24 The CDS making up a
Synthetic CDO are essentially insurance contracts, where in return
for regular payments from the protection buyers, protection sellers
guarantee against default of the underlying instruments.25 The long
party is thus betting that the bonds will not decrease in value, and
they will continue to get insurance premiums without having to pay
while the short party is betting that the bonds will decrease in value,
meaning they will get a payout based on that value. When all the
CDSs are taken together, they can be structured so that the cash
flows are very similar to what a CDO made of the same securities
would have paid, allowing parties to treat them very similarly, and
giving parties exposure to a certain type of credit risk that would
not otherwise be available.
B. The Market
With an understanding of the structure of Synthetic CDOs, it is
time to turn to how investors use them to make money. Tranches of
CDOs,26 like many securities, are given a credit rating by a rating
agency like Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s. The credit rating of a
23. In addition to actual default, a security’s downgrade by a rating agency is often a
credit event.
24. Frank Partnoy and David A. Skeel, Jr., Debt as a Lever of Control: The Promise and Perils
of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1022 (2007).
25. Gibson, supra note 20, at 6–8.
26. The distinction between CDO and Synthetic CDO is unimportant here. I will use
“CDO” to mean both.
WINTER 2015] Fraud is Already Illegal 571
tranche of a CDO is an assessment of its creditworthiness. Accord-
ing to Standard & Poor’s, “The likelihood of default is the single
most important factor in [that] assessment.”27
Prior to the financial crisis, many market participants bought
RMBSs and CDOs based solely on their price and credit rating with-
out investigating the underlying loans making up the securities.
This provided a profitable opportunity for firms that had the time
and resources to investigate the quality of the underlying assets.
Though rating agencies are careful not to represent that their rat-
ings are an absolute measure of default probability,28 over the five
years following being rated, the highest-rated debt has only de-
faulted 0.23% of the time.29 But ratings are really a range of
probabilities, with each security of a certain rating having a slightly
different actual probability. This means that investors could make a
profit by determining whether the securities were on the lower or
higher end of that range. Consequently, investors who tailored
their investment strategy based on underlying assets’ actual risk
were in a position to profit off of investors who only based their
strategy on the risk of default implied by a tranche’s credit rating.
This conduct is not illegal; it is capitalism. In all areas of the mar-
ket, a party that has done its research is in a position to profit from
a counterparty operating with limited information. For example, if
someone buying a car with 90,000 miles has not done their research
and does not know that the car’s brakes will likely fail before reach-
ing 100,000 miles, the seller has no duty to disclose this fact.30
Similarly, a party selling a security is generally under no obligation
to inform a counterparty that the assets are riskier than their credit
ratings imply. In both transactions, the seller’s only obligation is to
not mislead their counterparty.
Like a seller with no duty to disclose that a car is prone to devel-
oping brake problems within the next 10,000 miles, organizers of a
CDO or Synthetic CDO have no general obligation to inform po-
tential buyers that they will probably lose money because the
27. Credit Ratings Definitions & FAQs, Standard & Poor’s (Sept. 7, 2014, 5:51 PM), http://
www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/definitions-and-faqs/en/us.
28. See, e.g., id. (“Standard & Poor’s ratings opinions are not intended as guarantees of
credit quality or as exact measures of the probability that a particular issuer or particular debt
issue will default.”).
29. See Greg M. Gupton et al., The RiskMetrics Group, CreditMetrics—Technical Docu-
ment 58 (2007), available at http://www.msci.com/resources/technical_documentation/
CMTD1.pdf.
30. This analogy is adapted from an article by Senators Merkley and Levin about their
amendments to the Dodd-Frank Act, including Section 621. See Senator Jeff Merkley & Sena-
tor Carl Levin, The Dodd-Frank Act Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Conflicts of Interest: New
Tools to Address Evolving Threats, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 515, 523 (2011).
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borrowers at the bottom of the transaction will likely default. When
the long party in a Synthetic CDO makes its decision to buy based
on credit rating and yield without much research into the underly-
ing assets, the short party who did this research is in a position to
make a perfectly legal profit off their counterparty’s failure to do
the same. However, if the car seller tampered with the brakes prior
to selling the car, that seller cannot rely on his counterparty’s fail-
ure to do research when the brakes fail.
C. ABACUS-2007-AC1
ABACUS-2007-AC1 is a now-notorious Synthetic CDO in which
one party added a wrinkle similar to the tampering salesman. The
“brakes” that did not work in the Abacus transaction were tampered
with when the short counterparty, who would benefit if the CDO
declined in value, helped select the securities that went into the
transaction. Because the short party only got paid if the securities
declined in value, they had an incentive to select the securities that
seemed likely to fail, creating a conflict of interest hidden from the
other side.
Abacus was a Synthetic CDO referencing ninety tranches of other
CDOs with an aggregate notional value of two billion dollars.31
Each underlying tranche was rated Baa2 by Moody’s,32 which is on
the lower end of what is typically considered investment grade, but
nonetheless associated with only a 1.7 percent risk of default during
the five years following being rated.33 Despite the ratings of the un-
derlying securities, the CDSs were packaged and repackaged such
that all of the notes actually sold to investors had a credit rating of
Aaa, the highest rating available.34 Additionally, Abacus did not
make use of overcollateralization, a commonly used method to
make the CDO more likely to pay out all investors, making it even
riskier than the average Synthetic CDO.35




33. GREG M. GUPTON ET AL., supra note 29, at 58.
34. See GOLDMAN SACHS, FINAL TERMSHEET, ABACUS-2007-AC1, LTD. 1 (July 2, 2007),
available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-docs/2007-03-00_Abacus%20
2007-AC1_CDO%20Term%20Sheet.pdf. Although other classes and ratings are mentioned,
only the Aaa-rated classes A-1 and A-2, were ever issued.
35. GOLDMAN SACHS, supra note 31, at 15. Overcollateralization involves putting extra
securities into a CDO than would be necessary to generate the promised cashflows if none of
the underlying assets defaulted. It is a common way to reduce the risk for the most junior
“equity” tranche of a CDO. See STONE AND ZISSU, supra note 4, at 36.
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In a normal Synthetic CDO, the portfolio is selected by a third
party with no interest in the transaction. The documents Goldman
used to market Abacus intimated that this was the case and stated
that the third party selecting the portfolio was ACA Capital Manage-
ment (“ACA”).36 The documents said that ACA was incentivized to
“avoid losses relative to a standard [CDO structure],” implying that
Abacus was less risky than a normal Synthetic CDO for long inves-
tors.37 However, Goldman never disclosed to investors that ACA’s
role was “essentially ministerial” and the real party that selected the
underlying assets was the short counterparty, the one who made
money if the assets declined in value, a Chicago hedge fund called
Paulson & Co.38 By 2006, the fund had a profit strategy aimed “spe-
cifically at profiting on subprime defaults,”39 and the selection of
assets in Abacus was a means to that end. Paulson & Co. focused on
filling Abacus with “bonds that weren’t going to perform,” knowing
that the company would profit when the bonds defaulted.40 If Aba-
cus was a used car, Paulson & Co. was a company who tampered
with the brakes and then took out an insurance policy on the car,
knowing it had a high likelihood of getting into a wreck.
Although the short counterparty’s intention to profit off of Aba-
cus’s decline in value would not be news to any of the long
parties—remember that is how a Synthetic CDO works—the fact
that the short counterparty had exercised control over selection of
its assets would have been a red flag to the long counterparties had
they known. In the term sheet it used to market Abacus, Goldman
disclosed the identities of the underlying securities, which ordina-
rily would have been all the information the long counterparties
should have needed to decide how much to pay for the Abacus
notes. Despite this, knowing that Paulson had played such a large
role in selecting the bonds would, at the very least, have caused the
long parties to take a second look before they decided to purchase.
If the long parties decided to go through with the transaction, they
likely would have demanded higher insurance premiums in ex-
change for assuming the risk that the securities in Abacus would
decline in value.41 The managing director of a credit rating agency
36. See, e.g., GOLDMAN SACHS, supra note 31, at 19; GOLDMAN SACHS, supra note 34, at 1.
37. GOLDMAN SACHS, supra note 31, at 13.
38. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 2, at 565.
39. Mark Whitehouse, As Home Owners Face Strains, Market Bets on Loan Defaults, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 30, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB116217677563707491.
40. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 2, at 567.
41. Something as simple as calling a counterparty an “opponent” rather than “partner”
without changing the underlying economics of a transaction can result in market participants
demanding higher prices. This leads to the inference that knowing Goldman was acting as an
agent of their “opponent” would cause long investors to demand higher prices. See Terence
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stated that the decision to purchase a product like Abacus is “more
of a qualitative not a quantitative assessment,”42 and knowledge of
Paulson’s identity would have “change[d] the whole dynamic of the
structure.”43 But the long investors were never informed.
As explained below, by deceiving its counterparties about the
true selection agent, Fabrice Tourre, the architect of the Abacus
deal at Goldman, as well as Goldman itself,44 violated federal law.
Eventually, Tourre was found liable for breaking securities laws and
for his role in the deal. But it does not follow that transactions with
conflicts of interest like Abacus should be per se illegal, which is
what Section 621 requires.45 If all conflicts are disclosed, transac-
tions like Abacus can increase market efficiency by allowing buyers
and sellers with different views on the quality of a security to take
one side of the transaction, which pushes prices toward the “true”
measure.46 Section 621 should be repealed because the default posi-
tion of disclosure available under the laws prior to Section 621 is
preferable.
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR CONFLICTED TRANSACTIONS
In general, issuers of securities have wide latitude in how they
conduct their businesses and how much they tell their investors, but
this is limited by the principle that anything they do communicate
in connection with the purchase or sale of their securities must be
truthful. For the purposes of the securities laws, “truthful” means
issuers have both a duty not to make affirmative misstatements and
a duty not to disclose “half-truths—literally true statements that cre-
ate a materially misleading impression.”47
A maze of regulations, most of which will not be addressed here,
governs the securities markets. This Part begins by discussing the
underlying themes in securities law, knowledge of which is neces-
sary to understand why Section 621 is such a radical shift. It then
Burnham, Kevin McCabe, & Vernon L. Smith, Friend-or-foe Intentionality Priming in an Extensive
Form Trust Game, 43 J. OF ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 57 (2000).
42. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 2, at 568.
43. Id. at 569.
44. The SEC filed suit against Goldman, but the parties reached settlement before trial.
By finding Fabrice Tourre liable for violating Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act, the jury
implicitly found Goldman liable since 20(e) is an aiding and abetting claim and Tourre was
accused of aiding and abetting Goldman’s violations. Verdict at 2, Sec. Exch. Comm’n v.
Fabrice Tourre, No. 10-cv-03229-KBF (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
45. See Part II, infra.
46. See Part III, infra.
47. Final Jury Charges at 19, Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Fabrice Tourre, No. 10-cv-03229-KBF
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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examines the federal antifraud laws governing transactions like Ab-
acus and contrasts those laws with Section 621.
A. Background of the Federal Securities Laws
The federal securities laws are incredibly broad in scope and in
many cases quite detailed. Like the Dodd-Frank Act, of which Sec-
tion 621 is a part, the major federal securities laws were enacted
shortly after a terrible financial crisis, the Crash of 1929, in a cli-
mate where many people’s trust in the markets had been severely
shaken. Like the Senators who viewed conflicts of interest like the
one in Abacus as a cause of the recent crisis,48 many people be-
lieved that the Great Depression was due in part to people who
stood to benefit from a collapse in prices.49
Though many federal laws govern the securities industries, by far
the two most important prior to the Dodd-Frank Act were the Se-
curities Act of 1933 (“The ’33 Act”)50 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (“The ’34 Act”).51 The discussion here will be limited to
the laws’ antifraud provisions, which govern conduct like what hap-
pened in Abacus. The antifraud provisions are quite general, and,
though they are clarified somewhat by rules promulgated by the
SEC, they are still left open to interpretation by judges. This has led
to the development of common law and has allowed interpretations
of the laws to evolve to take account of situations that the original
writers would not have imagined.52
48. See Letter from Sens. Jeff Merkley & Carl Levin to Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency et al. (Feb. 13, 2012), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2012/
February/20120216/R-1432/R-1432_021412_104998_542080912901_1.pdf [hereinafter
Merkley-Levin Rulemaking Comment] (Comment on rulemaking by OCC, Federal Reserve,
FDIC, SEC and CFTC repeatedly citing Abacus transaction as reason for rules against con-
flicts of interest); Letter from Sens. Jeff Merkley & Carl Levin to Ben Bernanke, Chairman,
Federal Reserve Board, et al. (Aug. 3, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-
title-vi/conflicts-of-interest/conflictsofinterest-2.pdf [hereinafter Merkley-Levin Letter to
Bernanke] (Letter to rulemakers shortly after passage of Dodd-Frank Act urging immediate
action on Merkley-Levin provisions).
49. Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42
STAN. L. REV. 385, 395 (1990).
50. Act of May 27, 1933, c. 38, Title I, § 1, 48 Stat. 74 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et
seq.).
51. Act of June 6, 1934, c. 404, Title I, § 1, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et
seq.).
52. The generality of the antifraud provisions is one of their biggest strengths. A set of
specific laws could give rise to the assumption that if something is not specifically covered,
this was a purposeful choice by Congress not to prohibit it. Lack of specificity as to exactly
what conduct is fraudulent leaves judges and juries free to apply the old laws to new situa-
tions. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943)
(discussing the reach of the laws beyond the “obvious and commonplace” and stating that
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In contrast to “merit” regulation of securities, which seeks to al-
low only high quality (as determined by a regulator) securities to be
sold, the ’33 and ’34 Acts do not attempt to determine which securi-
ties are of sufficient quality to be sold. President Roosevelt, whose
campaign platform included securities reform, stated shortly after
his election that the government “cannot and should not take any
action which might be construed as approving or guaranteeing that
newly issued securities are sound in the sense that their value will be
maintained or that the properties which they represent will earn
profit.”53 Instead, the purpose of the securities laws he proposed
was to ensure that “no essentially important element attending the
issue shall be concealed from the buying public” and to put “the
burden of telling the whole truth on the seller,” giving “impetus to
honest dealing in securities and thereby bring back public
confidence.”54
True to President Roosevelt’s vision, the Acts’ mandate that se-
curities issuers truthfully disclose a great deal of information about
the security, but do not attempt to distinguish the good buys from
the bad. Rather than simply preventing certain securities from be-
ing sold, the goal of the ’3355 and ’3456 Acts and their subsequent
amendments is to ensure full disclosure of material facts and allow
investors to make their own informed decisions. The laws were de-
signed to protect potential investors from shady issuers, not from
their own bad decision-making.57
Rather than a blanket ban on certain transactions, the securities
laws promote a full-disclosure policy, allowing the investor to work
out for himself whether the securities are worth the money. The
laws respect investors’ autonomy, protecting them from fraudulent
disclosure, but allowing them to decide in light of that disclosure
whether to purchase the securities. For example, in marketing Aba-
cus, Goldman distributed a pitchbook and termsheet outlining the
their purpose was to regulate “[n]ovel, uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever they ap-
pear to be.”).
53. Charles J. Johnson, Jr. & Joseph McLaughlin, CORPORATE FINANCE AND THE SECURI-
TIES LAWS § 1:02 (4th ed., 2013).
54. Id.
55. “It cannot be emphasized too often that the 1933 Act is a disclosure statute. Its prin-
cipal purpose, as set forth in its preamble, is to provide ‘full and fair disclosure of the
character of securities.’ ” Id. at § 1:05.
56. See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988) (the “fundamental pur-
pose” of the ‘34 Act is “implementing a philosophy of full disclosure.”).
57. The ’33 Act was “designed merely to secure essential facts for the investor, not to
substitute the government’s judgment for his own.” F. Frankfurter, The Federal Securities Act: II,
Fortune 53, 108 (August 1933), cited in CORPORATE FINANCE AND THE SECURITIES LAWS, supra
note 53 at §1:05.
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structure of its proposed Synthetic CDO.58 True to the purposes of
the ’33 and ’34 Acts, the representations in those documents were
required to be truthful, meaning that what they said had to be liter-
ally true and could not create misleading impressions by leaving out
details that a potential investor would consider material to their de-
cision whether to buy or sell the security.
B. Liability for Conflicted Transactions Under the Antifraud Provisions
1. Section 17(a) and Section 10(b)
The primary antifraud provisions relevant to transactions like Ab-
acus are Section 17(a)59 of the ’33 Act and Section 10(b)60 of the
’34 Act. Though they have differences, both Sections 17(a) and
10(b) prohibit the same basic conduct: lying to or misleading a
counterparty about a material fact involving a security. Section
17(a) concerns offers to sell the security as well as actual sales, while
Section 10(b) only concerns actual sales. As will be shown, the con-
duct of Fabrice Tourre, the Goldman employee who implemented
the Abacus transaction, as well as the conduct of Goldman itself,61
was already illegal under Sections 17(a) and 10(b), obviating the
need for any new prohibitions.
In marketing a security like Abacus, liability can stem from any of
the three subsections of Section 17(a), which states that it shall be
illegal
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue state-
ment of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not mislead-
ing; or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of busi-
ness which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon the purchaser.62
58. GOLDMAN SACHS, supra note 31; GOLDMAN SACHS, supra note 34.
59. Securities Exchange Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a).
60. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
61. See supra text accompanying note 44.
62. Securities Exchange Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a).
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The section prohibits not only affirmative lies, but also certain
lies of omission. It is broader than just conduct, prohibiting other
“course[s] of business” or “scheme[s]” that would defraud a
counterparty. Only Section 17(a)(1) requires a showing of intent or
recklessness; Sections 17(a)(2) and (3) both require only a showing
of negligence.63
Liabilities can also stem from violations of Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 thereunder,64 which like Section 17(a) prohibit lies of
omission and commission, misleading conduct, and other devices,
schemes, or artifices to defraud. A finding of liability under Section
10(b) or Rule 10b-5 requires a showing of either intent or reckless-
ness.65 Unlike Section 17(a), a finding of liability under Section
10(b) requires an actual purchase or sale, not just an offer to sell.66
2. Applied to Abacus
Although the antifraud provisions of the securities laws do not
apply to a homeowner applying for a mortgage, they do come into
play when that mortgage is securitized and sold to others. In order
to understand why Abacus was a problem, it is important to under-
stand how liability in the transaction was created. In the discussion
that follows, it is important to remember that it is not illegal to be
smarter than one’s counterparty or to have done more research, it
is illegal to lie to them. This distinction is key.
The securities referenced by a Synthetic CDO like Abacus are
collections of home loans. Certain homeowners will pay their loans
and certain homeowners will not, but whether a hedge fund thinks a
homeowner will pay their mortgage does not influence whether the
homeowner actually does. Only whether a homeowner actually pays
their mortgage influences the performance of a Synthetic CDO in-
cluding that mortgage. Because the parties who selected securities
referenced by a Synthetic CDO cannot influence the performance
of the product itself—they cannot choose who defaults on their
loan—the identity of who selected the underlying securities should
be irrelevant to determining their value.
63. Compare Final Jury Charges, supra note 47, at 22 (state of mind for 17(a)(1) claims is
intent or recklessness), with id. at 25, and id. at 32 (state of mind for 17(a)(2) and (3) claims
includes negligence).
64. Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5.
65. Final Jury Charges, supra note 47, at 42–43.
66. Id. at 37; see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754 (1975).
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The value of Abacus could have been determined solely from the
list provided at the end of the term sheet, which named each secur-
ity that would be referenced by the Abacus Synthetic CDO.67 From
the list, an investor could identify which RMBSs were contained in
the CDO tranches, and, armed with that knowledge, she could in-
vestigate the underlying securities and determine their value and
attendant level of risk. Indeed, that is exactly what Paulson & Co.
did in selecting securities to place into Abacus. Neither the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) nor any parties to the
transaction ever alleged that this list itself was misleading.
Despite this, Goldman and its salespeople knew that appearances
matter. Recognizing the likelihood that a potential long party
would be especially likely to take a second look at the transaction if
they knew that Paulson & Co. had both selected the underlying se-
curities and positioned itself as the short party, Goldman’s
pitchbook for the Abacus transaction failed to mention Paulson &
Co.’s role in the process. Goldman’s pitchbook for the proposed
Abacus deal stated the reference portfolio was “selected by ACA
Management,” which was incentivized to select assets that would
not decline in value, meaning potential long investors would infer
that they would not lose money since the company that selected the
assets was making the same bet.68 As a regular participant in the
securitization market, Goldman knew that the fact that less than
half the assets were actually selected by ACA ran “counter to what
the usual assumption” was about the structure of a normal CDO.69
Under the law prior to Section 621, neither Paulson & Co. nor
Goldman broke any laws when they selected RMBSs that seemed
likely to decline in value as the reference securities for Abacus. So
long as they dealt honestly with their counterparties, Paulson & Co.
and Goldman could sell whatever securities they wanted. Section
621 has not changed this duty not to defraud investors. The illegal-
ity occurred when Paulson & Co. and Goldman made it appear that
the CDOs Abacus referenced were selected by a party who wanted
them to go up in value, rather than down.70 The affirmative lies
67. See Final Termsheet, supra note 34, at 8–9.
68. GOLDMAN SACHS, supra note 31, at i.
69. The “usual assumption,” of course, is that when a pitchbook says the assets are “se-
lected by” a party, they actually are selected by that party. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE,
supra note 2, at 569; see also Letter from Jeffrey W. Rubin, Chair, Committeee on Federal
Regulation of Securities, American Bar Association, to Securities and Exchange Commission,
at 4–5 (Oct. 29, 2010), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/committees/CL410
000pub/comments/20101029000000.pdf (“Potential conflicts of the type [covered by Sec-
tion 621 (the same existing in Abacus)] that either exist, or are contemplated, at the time of
an ABS transaction are customarily disclosed in the offering materials.”).
70. See Verdict, supra note 44.
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about the involvement of Paulson & Co.,71 as well as the deceptive
wording in other parts of the pitchbook, made it look like long in-
vestors had nothing to fear because the selecting party in the
transaction was on the same side, when in fact the selecting party
was in an adversarial position.72
Although Goldman and Tourre had no affirmative duty to dis-
close who structured the CDO, the antifraud provisions required
any statement or other representation they did make regarding who
picked the assets to be truthful and not misleading.73 Hiding Paul-
son & Co.’s role in the transaction from the long counterparties was
illegal, and a jury found that Tourre’s misleading statements and
conduct violated Sections 17(a) and 10(b).74
C. The Dodd-Frank Act
In the wake of the financial crisis, many argued that existing laws
had failed and a new regulatory regime was necessary to prevent
another meltdown.75 The Dodd-Frank Act is a regulatory response
to the excesses, some real and some perceived, of Wall Street in the
2000s.76 It has more than 1,500 sections, covering everything from
the conflicts of interest in asset-backed securitizations discussed
here, to provisions providing for orderly liquidation of failing
banks,77 and even special reporting requirements relating to mine
safety.78 A full analysis of the ways it impacts the financial industry
could fill an entire treatise79 and most of the effects are not relevant
here. The three sections that will be analyzed are Section 621,
which proscribes conflicts of interest in securitizations and is the
focus of this Note, and two sections that may provide a preview of
71. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 2, at 569.
72. The deceptive wording included describing what looked like the equity tranche as
“pre-committed” and implying that Paulson & Co. was buying it when in fact the Abacus
structure did not have an equity tranche. Id. at 569–70.
73. See, e.g., Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1321–22 (2011).
74. See Verdict, supra note 44, at 1–2.
75. E.g. Stephen Labaton, Leading Senator Pushes New Plan to Oversee Banks, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 20, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/20/business/economy/
20regulate.html.
76. Binyamin Appelbaum & David M. Herszenhorn, Congress Passes Major Overhaul of Fi-
nance Rules, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2010, at A1.
77. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 201–217, 12 U.S.C.
§ 5390–97.
78. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1503, 12 U.S.C.
§ 78m-2.
79. See, e.g., COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CON-
SUMER PROTECTION ACT: LAW, EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS (2010).
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how Section 621 would likely operate in practice: Section 619, the
Volcker Rule, and Section 941, which governs risk retention.
1. Section 621
In 2011, the Senate released a report on the financial crisis. This
report contained four recommendations for reforming the invest-
ment banking industry in the wake of the financial crisis. One
recommendation contained a number of provisions aimed at re-
stricting conflicts of interest, including Section 621.80
Section 621 states, in pertinent part, that:
An underwriter, placement agent, initial purchaser, or spon-
sor, or any affiliate or subsidiary of any such entity, of an asset-
backed security ( . . . [including] a synthetic asset-backed se-
curity), shall not, at any time for a period ending on the date
that is one year after the date of the first closing of the sale of
the asset-backed security, engage in any transaction that would in-
volve or result in any material conflict of interest with respect to any
investor in a transaction arising out of such activity.81
Recognizing that certain traditional investment banking activities
are unlikely to harm investors, this provision makes exceptions for
the following: (1) hedging transactions, which are designed not to
make money for the bank but instead to reduce the risk caused by a
separate trade;82 (2) underwriting, or committing to sell a certain
number of securities to customers and purchase them for their own
account if unable to sell;83 and (3) market-making, meaning buying
from customers who want to sell and selling to customers who want
to buy without any expectation of profit or loss from the
transaction.84
Despite regulating a large area of the economy, the provision is
quite open-ended and directs the SEC to adopt specific rules imple-
menting the provision to clarify which activities it covers.85 The SEC
proposed rules to implement the provision in 2011, but since then
80. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 2, at 639.
81. Securities Exchange Act of 1933 § 27(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2a(a) (emphasis added).
82. Id. at (c)(1).
83. Id. at (c)(2)(A).
84. Id. at (c)(2)(B).
85. Id. at (b).
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has not advanced the proposal.86 Because the rules have not been
finalized, Section 621 has not yet taken effect.87
Though the proposed rules are over fifty pages long, they fail to
precisely define a “material conflict of interest.”88 The SEC takes
the position that any definition could be “both over- and under-
inclusive,” because of the “complex and evolving nature of the
securitization markets.”89 Instead, the SEC proposes a two-part test
to determine whether a conflict of interest exists. Under the pro-
posed test, a party has a material and, therefore, prohibited conflict
of interest if:
(1)(a) the party would benefit from the adverse performance
of the security, or
(b) the party controlling the selection of assets in the security
will receive benefits from a third party with an interest in the
adverse performance of the security and allowed that third
party to help select the assets; and
(2) it is substantially likely that a reasonable investor would
take that into account in making an investment decision.90
Basically, the proposed rule prohibits per se what was formerly ille-
gal only if undisclosed.91 Rather than relying on full disclosure to
allow investors to make informed decisions, the provision and the
proposed rule completely prevent investors from deciding. This pa-
ternalism is a departure from previous practice, which focused on
disclosure as the best remedy for potential problems.92 Further-
more, it has the potential to distort the market93 without offering
86. Prohibition Against Conflicts of Interest in Certain Securitizations, 76 Fed. Reg.
60,320 (proposed Sept. 28, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 230) [hereinafter “Proposed
Conflicts Rule”].
87. Pub. L. 111–203, title VI, § 621(b), 124 Stat. 1632 (2010) (“[Section 621], shall take
effect on the effective date of final rules issued by the Commission under subsection (b) of
such section.”).
88. Proposed Conflicts Rule, supra note 86, at 60,329.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See discussion, infra Part III.
92. See, e.g., Mary Jo White, The Importance of Independence, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 3,
2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539864016#.VAyJmWSwLdI
(“’The foundational cornerstone of the [SEC’s] regulatory regime has remained fixed. It is
disclosure. For over 75 years, the SEC’s signature mandate has been to use disclosure to
promote transparency.’”) (internal citations omitted); Daniel M. Gallagher, Remarks to the
Forum for Corporate Directors, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/
Speech/Detail/Speech/1370540680363#.VAyIymSwLdI (“The SEC is, first and foremost, a
disclosure agency. . . . That is the foundation of our securities law regime and the core princi-
ple by which we administer those laws.”).
93. See discussion, infra Part III.C.
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any material improvements because the conduct was already illegal
if undisclosed.94
2. Sections 619 and 941
The Dodd-Frank Act was a comprehensive attempt to reform the
financial system and prevent a financial crisis like the one that
started in 2008. Many people thought securitization was at least
partly to blame for the financial crisis, so many sections of the Act
deal with it in some respect. Of the sections that deal with securi-
tization, two warrant special mention: Section 619 and Section 941.
The final text of the rule implementing Section 619, referred to
as the “Volcker Rule,” runs to roughly 1,000 pages. Most of its ef-
fects are not relevant here, as many of the entities that issue
securitizations are not covered banking entities. This Note will only
examine the provision prohibiting conflicts of interest and the ex-
ceptions from the proprietary trading rule. Because regulators have
already begun interpreting the exceptions in Section 619 and Sec-
tions 619 and 621 are worded similarly, understanding the way the
exceptions have been applied under that rule may provide insight
into Section 621, where rulemaking has yet to be completed.
The Volcker Rule proscribes proprietary trading by banking enti-
ties95 subject to certain exceptions. These exceptions, like the
exceptions to Section 621, allow an otherwise prohibited trade if it
is for the purpose of underwriting,96 market-making,97 or risk-miti-
gating hedging,98 along with other minor exceptions.99 This means
that, under the Volcker Rule, proprietary trading, while generally
prohibited, is allowed if the trade falls under a recognized excep-
tion. However, there is a “backstop” prohibition against conflicts of
interest, meaning if activity that would otherwise fall into an excep-
tion results in a conflict of interest, it remains prohibited.100 The
conflict of interest backstop in the Volcker Rule, unlike Section
621, allows issuers to “cure”101 their conflict of interest by either
94. See discussion, infra Part III.B.
95. 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5781.
96. Id. at 5783.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 5784.
99. Namely, an exception to trade U.S. government securities. Id. at 5785.
100. Id. at 5786–5787; see also Final Volcker Rule Proprietary Trading Flowcharts, DAVIS
POLK & WARDWELL LLP (Dec. 23, 2013), http://www.davispolk.com/download.php?file=
sites/default/files/DavisPolk_Final_Volcker_Rule_Flowcharts_Prop_Trading_0.pdf.
101. 79 Fed. Reg 5536, 5787.
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disclosing the conflict prior to engaging in the transaction102 or us-
ing information barriers within the firm to prevent it from
benefitting from this conflict.103
The conflicts prohibition in the Volcker Rule can be seen as, in a
way, the inverse of Section 621. The Volcker Rule allows hedging or
market making unless those activities result in a conflict of interest
not cured through disclosure or information barriers. In contrast,
Section 621 prohibits conflicts of interest unless they fall into a
listed exception like hedging or market-making and does not allow
issuers to remedy their conflict through disclosure or information
barriers.
Section 941,104 commonly referred to as the risk retention provi-
sion, adds a new section to the ’34 Act requiring creators of asset-
backed securities like CDOs (but not Synthetic CDOs105) to put
“skin in the game”106 by retaining at least five percent of the credit
risk for any security they create.107 Although the exact structure of
the rules implementing Section 941 is not yet finalized,108 market
participants expect that the rules will achieve their goal of giving
issuers a disincentive from selling securities that will lose money for
their customers because the issuer will lose money as well.109 Sec-
tion 621 makes clear that the holdings required by the risk
retention provision will not be considered a conflict of interest.110
Even without the clarity of a final rule, and despite the excep-
tions for certain activity, the scope of Section 621 is no doubt wider
than prior law and prohibits a great deal more conduct than was
illegal before. In addition, other sections of the Dodd-Frank Act are
better suited to remedy the illegal activity at issue in Abacus. As
noted above, the abuses in Abacus were already illegal under fed-
eral law. The broad scope of Section 621 sweeps in market activity
102. Id..
103. Id..
104. Credit Risk Retention, 78 Fed. Reg. 57,928. (proposed Sept. 20, 2013) (to be codi-
fied at scattered sections of the C.F.R.).
105. Id. at 57,936 n.36.
106. Kevin L. Petrasic & Amanda J. Kowalski, Regulators Re-Propose Dodd-Frank QRM Rule,
PAUL HASTINGS 1 (Sept. 2013), http://www.paulhastings.com/Resources/Upload/Publica
tions/Re-Proposed%20QRM%20Rule.pdf.
107. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(c)(1)(B)(i).
108. See Credit Risk Retention, 78 Fed. Reg. at 57,931.
109. See, e.g., Christopher B. Killiam, Credit Risk Retention; Re-Proposed Rule, SIFMA (Oct.
30, 2013), available at http://www.sifma.org/comment-letters/2013/sifma-and-other-associa
tions-submit-comments-to-multiple-federal-agencies-on-credit-risk-retention/ (stating 5 per-
cent risk retention requirement aligns interest of sponsors and investors) [hereinafter SIFMA
Letter].
110. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2a(d) (2012).
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that is good, which could distort the market, while the detrimental
activity it prohibits was already illegal.
III. THE CASE FOR REPEAL
The stated purpose of Section 621 is to “put an end to [the] con-
flict-ridden practices”111 that produced Abacus and to the economic
harm that the undisclosed conflicts of interest caused.112 Section
621, however, is a solution in search of a problem. It is unnecessary,
potentially harmful, and should be repealed. This Part lays out the
reasons why Section 621 is not the right response to transactions
like Abacus. It begins by explaining that existing law already prohib-
its the conduct that Section 621’s sponsors wanted to address.
Then, it discusses why other justifications for Section 621, like those
coming from behavioral economics, are unpersuasive. Lastly, it
shows that Section 621 is over-inclusive and prohibits market con-
duct that has never been viewed as problematic and that, in fact,
aids efficient price discovery.
A. Adequacy of Existing Law
Perhaps the most obvious reason that Section 621 should be re-
pealed became apparent in July, 2013 when the man who had been
referred to as the “architect” of the Abacus transaction, Fabrice
Tourre,113 was convicted of violating Section 17(a) of the ’33 Act
and Section 10(b) of the ’34 Act.114 The specific wrongdoing for
which Tourre was found liable was concealing Paulson & Co.’s in-
volvement in the transaction, which the jury determined was a piece
of information an average investor would want to know and, thus, a
material omission. As discussed above, this was exactly the way the
laws were supposed to work.115 Section 621 does not make a major
difference because proving a violation still requires proving that the
111. Merkley-Levin Letter to Bernanke, supra note 48, at 5.
112. See, e.g., id.
113. Trial of Ex-Goldman Sachs Trader Begins in New York, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 15, 2013,
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/trial-goldman-sachs-trader-opens-new-york.
114. Verdict, supra note 44.
115. See discussion, supra Part II.B.2.
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conflict is material;116 the only major change is that plaintiffs no
longer must prove that the conflict was not disclosed.117
If there were questions about whether the general prohibitions
in Sections 17(a) and 10(b) applied to the specific situation where
an issuer misrepresents the party responsible for choosing the com-
ponent securities in a CDO in its marketing materials, Section 621
may have been an appropriate response. However, at Fabrice
Tourre’s trial, the court firmly ruled that the securities laws do
cover undisclosed conflicts of interest in marketing materials, like
in the Abacus transaction, and many other cases have held simi-
larly.118 As there is no uncertainty about whether the laws apply,
Section 621 does not increase investor protection because there is
no evidence that an issuer willing to break one law will be deterred
by another law prohibiting substantially similar conduct.
If additional investor protections are needed to prevent fraud,
such protections are more appropriately achieved through contrac-
tual guarantees than outright prohibitions. Contractual guarantees
allow a party in a transaction to force their counterparty to disclose
conflicts. If a potential buyer of a stake in a Synthetic CDO transac-
tion finds the counterparty’s involvement in the reference portfolio
selection to be important, then the buyer could simply ask the is-
suer whether or not the counterparty was involved or whether the
issuer itself had a conflict of interest. If the issuer answered in the
116. Proposed Conflict Rule, supra note 86, at 60,329. The language in part (b) of the
rule is identical to the materiality test used in securities actions. See, e.g., TSC Industries, Inc.
v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988).
117. Because Section 621 makes conflicts themselves illegal, not just undisclosed con-
flicts, it would not be necessary for plaintiffs to prove whether or not a conflict was disclosed,
just that it existed. Private plaintiffs, but not the government, also need to prove reliance on
the fraudulent statements, though this is often presumed in omission cases. See, e.g., Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152–54 (1972). But see Jennifer O’Hare, Synthetic
CDOs, Conflicts of Interest, and Securities Fraud, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 667, 692–696 (2014) (dis-
cussing issuers’ use of “big boy letters” to defeat presumption of reliance). Part IV, infra,
discusses whether sophisticated parties should be able to say they are “big boys” and contract
around this issue. Part III.A, supra, discusses securities laws’ objective to protect investors
from nondisclosure, not from themselves.
118. The finding of liability in the Tourre case is not the only such finding. As there have
been no shortage of successful enforcement actions in other cases involving conflicts of inter-
est in CDO transactions, any uncertainty would be unwarranted. See, e.g., Press Release, Sec.
& Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Merrill Lynch With Misleading Investors in CDOs: Firm
Agrees to $131 Million Settlement (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/
Detail/PressRelease/1370540492377; Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Citigroup to Pay
$285 Million to Settle SEC Charges for Misleading Investors About CDO Tied to Housing
Market (Oct. 19, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-214.htm; Press Release,
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, J.P. Morgan to Pay $153.6 Million to Settle SEC Charges of Misleading
Investors in CDO Tied to U.S. Housing Market (June 21, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2011/2011-131.htm; Aladdin Capital Mgmt. LLC & Aladdin Capital LLC, Securities
Act Release No. 9374, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3514 (Dec. 17, 2012).
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affirmative, the buyer could refuse to buy or lower their bid to com-
pensate for the increased risk. If the issuer answered in the
negative, the buyer could rest assured that they were protected be-
cause that affirmative response is clearly covered by existing
antifraud provisions.
Even if the issuer refused to answer, the buyer would be pro-
tected because he or she would know that any rational issuer who
was not conflicted would state as such and be willing to be bound by
the antifraud provisions. Therefore, any issuer who did not answer
a direct question about conflicts could be safely assumed to have a
conflict of interest and the potential buyer could either lower their
bid accordingly or decline to participate in the presumptively con-
flicted transaction.119
B. Market Distortion
If Section 621 were merely duplicative, no harm would result
from simply allowing the rules to take effect. However, Section 621
is not so benign. The flat prohibition on conflicts of interest has the
potential to alter market structures in a detrimental way. For exam-
ple, the ban removes part of the Synthetic CDO market, which has
the potential to create price distortions that could lead to asset bub-
bles. In addition, Section 621 prevents parties from hedging some
balance sheet risk, meaning they can potentially become overlever-
aged. If a systemically important institution becomes overleveraged
and is unable to use synthetic securitizations to hedge some of that
risk, it could become insolvent which could have painful effects on
the rest of the financial system. These two risks are discussed below,
in turn.
Section 621 distorts the normal operation of market forces. By
preventing conflicted parties from taking part in a transaction, it
keeps prices from being as accurate as they would otherwise be.
This can lead to the underlying assets becoming overpriced because
it prevents certain parties from betting on the market and exerting
downward price pressure.120 This mispricing of securities may, in
119. Joshua R. Rosenthal, Burning Down the House or Simply Rolling the Dice: A Comment on
Section 621 of the Dodd-Frank Act and Recommendation for Its Implementation, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP.
& FIN. L. 1263, 1297–99 (2012). Contractual “warranties” of the quality of securities issued by
reputable issuers followed by purchaser discounting of securities that do not come with such
a guarantee is a classic solution to the “lemon problem,” which is widely discussed in law and
economics literature. See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970).
120. This risk is compounded by the fact that, like many bonds, CDOs are not liquid
enough to short. As noted above, short sellers exert downward pressure on prices, but in an
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turn, lead to overextension of credit to homebuyers since the cost
to an issuer of protecting against their default is lower than it would
otherwise be if the market were allowed to work unimpeded. This
overextension of credit to homebuyers could, in turn, cause an as-
set bubble akin to the bubble in the housing market that resulted in
the financial crisis. Said another way, Section 621 could actually
cause the reoccurrence of the negative effects it was designed to
prevent.
When one party believes that the borrowers of a certain pool of
mortgages will continue to pay their loans while another party be-
lieves that some of the borrowers will default, a Synthetic CDO
referencing the securities containing those underlying mortgages
allows both parties to express their views on the probabilities of de-
fault or continued payment. The buyer of a short position in a
Synthetic CDO is making a bet that the price of the referenced se-
curities will go down and they will be able to get “insurance”
payouts in excess of the premium they paid to insure the assets. The
price a short party pays for a position in a Synthetic CDO is re-
flected by the percentage of the insured value it pays to the long
party each quarter. A short party willing to pay a high percentage is
more confident that securities will go down in value than a party
willing to pay a smaller amount.
When the parties enter into the transaction, their views have an
effect on prices; if many people in the market believe that mortgage
holders will default en masse, they will all bid on protection offered
by Synthetic CDOs. This increased demand will result in long par-
ties charging a higher price for the protection. Even though
synthetic CDOs do not actually contain any securities, the pricing of
the insurance offered by a Synthetic CDO exerts an influence on
the price of the underlying asset because parties can choose to buy
either a real CDO or its synthetic clone depending on which is
cheaper.121 If, due to Section 621, certain short parties are not able
illiquid market where shorting is impossible, the only way to exert any downward pressure is
through a synthetic CDO. See ANTULIO N. BOMFIM, UNDERSTANDING CREDIT DERIVATIVES AND
RELATED INSTRUMENTS  37– 38 (2005).
121. See BOMFIM, supra note 120, at 39–40  (noting that some market observers suggest
that CDS prices incorporate new information aster than the underlying assets); William Ar-
rata, Alejandro Bernales and Virginie Coudert, The Effects of Derivatives on Underlying Financial
Markets: Equity Options, Commodity Futures and Credit Default Swaps, in 50 YEARS OF MONEY AND
FINANCE: LESSONS AND CHALLENGES 445, 459–66 (2013). The carrying costs, poor liquidity,
and counterparty risk involved in a synthetic CDO mean the movements of prices in the
synthetic CDO market will not have a one-to-one relationship with the prices of their underly-
ing securities. See Arrata et al. supra. For a more detailed examination of the relationship
between cash CDOs and synthetics, see Brian McManus, Anik Ray & David Freston, Index
Mania and the Growth of CDS Markets, 12 J. OF STRUCTURED FINANCE 13 (2006) (discussing role
of CDS indices as check on price appreciation in CDOs).
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to bid because of their conflicts of interest, the short exposure on a
Synthetic CDO would decrease, allowing a party to buy the protec-
tion on the security (the Synthetic CDO) for a price less than it
would pay for the actual security (the CDO). The difference in
prices between the synthetic and actual assets would result because
not all parties would be able to participate in the market for buying
protection. Because protection is so cheap, the investors will be
able to afford bidding up the price of the actual asset.
Beyond possibly contributing to asset bubbles, Section 621 pre-
vents firms from managing risk as effectively as they otherwise
could. Prior to the crisis, a common way for firms to reduce their
exposure to a certain type of asset on their balance sheet was to
structure a Synthetic CDO and take the short position on that se-
curity. A firm with a CDO investment could thus transfer the risk of
default to a different party while retaining ownership of the under-
lying asset. Even though this is often more cost-effective for both
parties than an outright sale, Section 621 prohibits it.122 The SEC
recognizes this “could have a negative effect on efficiency and capi-
tal formation,”123 which is its mission to promote.124
C. Behavioral Justifications are Unpersuasive
There is a second, potentially stronger argument in favor of Sec-
tion 621 that can be paraphrased as follows:125 Investors are not
always rational. Even when they know their advisors have conflicts
of interest, investors fail to adequately account for those conflicts by
discounting the price they are willing to pay for an investment or by
122. Balance sheet Synthetic CDOs “would generally be prohibited under the proposed
rule . . . . Though securitization participants might be able to effect similar types of transac-
tions in the form of non-synthetic ABS (which generally would not be prohibited by the
above interpretation of material conflict of interest), there may be reasons why a synthetic
form of a balance sheet CDO is a more efficient form of the transaction from the standpoint
of the issuer or investors. In addition, this aspect of the proposed rule would limit the hedg-
ing options available to a lender who originated assets without the intent to securitize them.”
Proposed Conflict Rule, supra note 86, at 60, 347.
123. Id.
124. “The mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is to protect inves-
tors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.” The
Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facili-
tates Capital Formation, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml
(last visited October 10, 2014).
125. This argument is laid out well by Daylian M. Cain, George Loewenstein, and Don A.
Moore in The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (2005).
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choosing not to participate in the transaction at all. In fact, disclo-
sure of conflicts of interest might perversely incentivize conflicted
parties to give even worse advice because they feel “morally licensed
and strategically encouraged to exaggerate” when recipients have
information that might cause them to discount the advice.126
Although this Note does not dispute the general premise of this
argument for most transactions, especially those involving unso-
phisticated investors, its application to transactions like Abacus is
not persuasive for two reasons. First, the Synthetic CDOs necessarily
involve opposing interests between the two parties that are impossi-
ble to remedy without prohibiting them altogether. Additionally,
both parties are sophisticated, professional investors paid to under-
take these transactions precisely because they are supposed to be
adept at valuing risky assets.
In a Synthetic CDO, long parties know they are betting against
short parties; the only way a long party can succeed is for the short
party to fail.127 The reverse is true as well: a short party can only
make money at the expense of the long party—if the reference se-
curities generate less cash than the long party expected. The long
and short investors assess the future cash flows from the reference
securities directly opposite from each other. Each thinks it is get-
ting the best of its respective counterparty and only one can be
right. Unlike a scenario with a conflicted advisor, the parties in a
Synthetic CDO are only relying on the issuer to facilitate their bets
against each other, not for advice. If the issuer has a conflict of
interest, the conflict does not affect any of the parties to the trans-
action because they know they are betting against someone, the
identity of whom is unimportant so long as that person did not help
select the underlying securities.
The misconduct at issue in Abacus was a failure of disclosure. In
situations where a party with a conflict of interest is giving advice,
evidence shows investors fail to adequately take the conflict of inter-
est into account.128 But here, there were no claims that anyone gave
bad advice to the long parties or that the long parties even wanted
that advice. The claims were that Goldman’s failure to disclose that
the short party had selected the underlying securities caused the
long investors to value them incorrectly. Because Goldman’s con-
flict did not affect any advice given to the long party and because
126. Id. at 1.
127. The SPE pays one party with cash received from the other when he or she is wrong
about which direction the security will move. See discussion, supra pp. 105–06.
128. Id. at 108–10.
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the conflict could not have influenced the performance of the un-
derlying securities, which depended on the ability of individual
borrowers to pay their mortgages, the conflict is not of the type
meant to be addressed by the behavioral argument.
In addition, the application of a behavioral argument to situa-
tions like Abacus is weakened by the fact that the parties were all
extraordinarily sophisticated. Abacus was only offered to Qualified
Institutional Buyers—investors with more than $100 million in liq-
uid assets.129 Even skeptics of the disclosure paradigm note that it is
more effective when parties to the disclosure “have extensive pro-
fessional experience” allowing them to gain a “reasonably accurate
idea” of how one party’s conflicts affect the information they pro-
vide.130 The long parties in Abacus “had an army of Ph.D. types,”131
exactly the sorts of people who know how to discount a conflicted
party’s advice, supporting the idea that it was nondisclosure of a
conflict of interest, not the conflict itself, that caused the problems.
It is therefore the nondisclosure, and not the conflict itself, that
should be the target of any solution.
Examining the behavioral arguments around securities regula-
tion, experts have noted the “one-way ratchet effect” of new laws.132
New regulations are “easy to promulgate but difficult to remove,”
and even when research shows the regulations are “imposing costs
in excess of benefits,” the research tends to be ignored.133 Because
of this, they argue for a “strong presumption against regulation”
when it takes the form, as Section 621 does, of “directly supplanting
market decisionmakers,” because these regulations have a high risk
of error.134 Rather than merely trying to help investors make the
right choice, Section 621 removes a choice altogether. Merely posit-
ing that some investors might behave irrationally in purchasing
securities where the issuer has a conflict of interest is not sufficient
evidence to remove the securities from the market. This is espe-
cially true in light of the successful application of securities laws,
prior to The Dodd-Frank Act, to discourage violations, as in SEC v.
Tourre. Section 621 is not the right answer.
129. Steven M. Davidoff & Claire A. Hill, Limits of Disclosure, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 599,
611 (2013).
130. Cain, Lowenstein, & Moore, supra note 125, at 20.
131. Davidoff & Hill, supra note 129, at 599 (punctuation and capitalization changed
slightly from original).
132. Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV.
1, 45 (2003).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 56–58.
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IV. A WAY FORWARD: AMENDING THE ISDA CONTRACT
Even without Section 621, much of the wrongdoing in transac-
tions like Abacus will not reoccur for the simple reason that it is no
longer profitable. Most CDOs are subject to the risk retention pro-
vision, which requires the originator of an asset-backed security like
a CDO to retain five percent of the risk in the transaction.135 Indus-
try commentators have noted this removes the incentive to create a
product that is likely to decline in value because if it does decline in
value, the originator will bear some of the loss.136 Thus, even if the
antifraud provisions did not adequately protect investors prior to
the adoption of the risk-retention provision in the Dodd-Frank Act,
they do now. However, the risk-retention provision does not apply
to Synthetic CDOs. Therefore, if Section 621 is repealed, an addi-
tional fix could more fully protect investors in Synthetic CDOs
without the negative effects of the proposed mandatory law.137
This Note proposes such a fix, and an easy one at that. Synthetic
CDOs are created using a series of CDSs, almost all of which use a
standard set of contracts written by the International Swaps and De-
rivatives Association (“ISDA”).138 Before parties enter into any CDS
with each other, they sign a Master Agreement which “governs
those aspects of the legal relationship between the two counterpar-
ties that are not specific to the CDS transaction at hand.”139 Then,
whenever they enter into a CDS, they exchange a Confirmation Let-
ter, a “fill in the blank” document from ISDA that is governed by
the Master Agreement but adds terms specific to the transaction.140
The same investor protection offered by Section 621 could be
achieved by simply adding a provision to the Master Agreement in
which the parties agree not to have material conflicts of interest in
transactions governed by the documents and to subrogate any
claims under the agreement to buyers of notes linked to any CDSs
governed by it. Then, should the parties in a certain transaction
decide that they are willing to tolerate a conflict of interest, they
would be able to waive the conflict of interest clause in their Confir-
mation Letter. But, if they do not waive the conflicts clause, they
can rely on the protection of the antifraud provisions of the securi-
ties laws.
135. See discussion, supra Part II.C.2.
136. See SIFMA Letter, supra note 109.
137. See discussion infra Part III.A.
138. See BOMFIM,, supra note 120, at 286–97.
139. Id. at 286.
140. Id. at 287.
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Amending the ISDA Master Agreement to make the default posi-
tion a ban on conflicts of interest allows parties to ensure they are
protected by the antifraud provisions in situations where a conflict
is not disclosed. Because most transactions are not subject to con-
flicts of interest and the confirmation letter is only five pages
long,141 there is little risk that parties to a CDS will be so buried
under disclosure that they will not notice when a firm wants to
waive the proposed conflicts clause of the Master Agreement. This,
in turn, will draw attention to the potential conflict of interest, and
ensure that the parties will have ample opportunity to adjust their
risk calculations to account for the conflict. This is preferable be-
cause it protects investors from unscrupulous issuers, but allows
sophisticated parties to contract around the no-conflicts clause
when a business need arises.
CONCLUSION
Market participants make money on Synthetic CDOs by research-
ing the referenced securities in order to determine how much they
should pay. They “are typically large, sophisticated financial institu-
tions, such as banks, pension funds, mutual funds, and hedge
funds,” with vast resources on hand to investigate what they are buy-
ing.142 The short party in the Abacus transaction, Paulson & Co.,
made nearly a billion dollars on the trade because it did exactly the
sort of research necessary to determine which securities were about
to fail. The conflict of interest was incidental to the transaction,
evidenced by Paulson & Co.’s ability to profit off of many other
short positions where it played no role in the selection of the un-
derlying assets.
Abacus was problematic not because of the conflict of interest
itself, but because the conflict was undisclosed. Had the long par-
ties known that the short party was involved in selection of the
reference securities, they may have lowered the price they were will-
ing to pay in order to compensate for the increased risk.
Alternatively, they could have declined to participate. Section 621
mandates the second option, but it does not force investors to make
smart decisions. The violations of the law committed by Goldman
and its salesman Fabrice Tourre had the effect of denying investors
141. Form of Confirmation, INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, http://www.isda.org/cgi-
bin/_isdadocsdownload/download.asp?DownloadID=276 (click on “ISDA Documents availa-
ble for transactional use”) (last visited Sept. 7, 2014).
142. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Roberta Mitchell Lecture: Structuring Responsibility in Securitiza-
tion Transactions, 40 CAP. U. L. REV. 803, 811 (2012).
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the choice whether to engage in a transaction with a conflicted
party. However, investors who made such a poor bet on the basis of
information that was available—the same information which the
short party used to predict that most of the securities underlying
Abacus would soon be worthless—would have likely lost their
money another way if they had not been able to take the long posi-
tion in Abacus.
Although prohibiting conflicts of interest allows lawmakers to re-
turn to their constituents trumpeting a new law, it is unclear
whether this will actually make the market safer since it does not
address the underlying basic failure by one party to research a
transaction. What the section does do is add potential systemic risk
and yet another layer of complexity to the financial system, increas-
ing costs and distorting the market without making a meaningful
addition to investor protection.
Goldman’s conflicts of interest could not have caused Abacus to
perform poorly; they could not make people default on their mort-
gages. Those borrowers would have defaulted regardless of the
illegal conduct in the Abacus securitization. “Markets can price and
expose risk, if we give them . . . the tools to do so,” like mandating
disclosure.143 Rather than preventing sophisticated participants in
the financial markets from taking on risks in securitizations they
create, the financial system should use full disclosure of material
information to help shift the risk to parties who are willing to bear
it.  Repealing Section 621 and replacing it with an update of the
ISDA Master Agreement is a better solution than simply banning
certain firms from profiting off securitizations they create.
143. Adam J. Levitin, Andrey D. Pavlov & Susan M. Wachter, Securitization: Cause or Remedy
of the Financial Crisis? 16 (Georgetown Univ. L. Ctr., Bus., Econ. & Regulatory Policy Paper
Series, Research Paper No. 1462895, Univ. of Penn., Inst. For L. & Econ., Research Paper No.
09-31, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1462895.
